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Units of Participation in IRA Common Trust Funds
Offered by Commercial Banks: A Violation of the
Glass-Steagall Act?
Since its passage in 1933, the Glass-Steagall Act has mandated
the separation of the commercial banking industry1 and the investment banking industry. 2 Recently, however, the distinction be-

tween the two has become blurred due to novel financial products
and services offered by both industries. 3 One such service is the
offering by commercial banks of units of participation 4 in common
trust funds consisting of individual retirement account ("IRA")
trust assets. At present, it is unclear whether a commercial bank
which offers such units of participation violates the Glass-Steagall
Act. The determination depends on two factors: (1) whether units
of participation constitute "securities" within the meaning of the
1 A commercial bank is "an institution authorized to receive both demand and time
deposits, to make loans of various types, to engage in trust services and other fiduciary
funds, to issue letters of credit, to accept and pay drafts, to rent safety deposit boxes, and to
engage in many similar activities." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 245 (5th ed. 1979). The major activity distinguishing commercial banks from other institutions is the banks' ability to
receive demand deposits. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348,
360 (D. Pa. 1962), rev'd, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
2 Investment banking consists of "underwriting and selling primarily new issues of
stocks and bonds to investors." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 741 (5th ed. 1979). The investment banker represents "the middleman between the corporation issuing new securities
and the public." Id.
3 Two products now offered by investment bankers that tend to blur the line of separation are money market mutual funds and asset management accounts. In a money market
mutual fund, the customer receives shares of common stock in a fund that consists of various money market instruments, i.e., short term commercial paper, certificates of deposit
and Treasury bills. The value of these shares fluctuates directly with the value of the fund.
In addition to the diversification feature, many of these funds offer a "check redemption"
procedure that allows an investor to write a check against a checking account maintained by
the fund at a commercial bank. Similarly, an asset management account provides the
money market mutual fund services and further provides access to the investor's assets by
either a check or credit/debit card.
Other activities include the offering of discount brokerage services through a bank affiliate. A discount broker merely executes the purchase and sell orders placed by its customers. It does not provide investment advice or analysis. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board
of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 104 S. Ct. 3003 (1984) (commonly referred to as
Schwab).
For a general discussion on the recent activities of investment banks and commercial
banks that blur the traditional line of separation, see PublicPolicy Issues Raised by Bank Securities Activities, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 339 (1983). See also H. Pitt & J. Williams, The GlassSteagallAct: Key Issues for the FinancialServices Industry, 11 SEC. REG. LJ. 234 (1983).
4 "Units of participation" represent the investor's interest in the common trust fund.
For a general description of how the arrangement operates, see notes 33-40 infra and accompanying text. The term "units of beneficial interest" is synonymous with units of participation. This note uses "units of participation" throughout.
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Glass-Steagall Act, and (2) whether these commercial bank offerings give rise to the hazards which Glass-Steagall was designed to
prevent.
This note attempts to clarify the law in this area and suggests
that based upon the policies underlying the Glass-Steagall Act,
units of participation in IRA common trust funds are securities and
may not be offered by commercial banks. Part I provides a textual
analysis of the Glass-Steagall Act, emphasizing those sections which
bear directly on whether a commercial bank may offer units of participation. Part II discusses two conflicting recent district court
opinions which indicate the confusion that exists in this area. Part
III synthesizes a two prong test from several Supreme Court decisions which have interpreted the Glass-Steagall Act in other contexts. Part IV applies this test to the units of participation problem
and concludes that, under Glass-Steagall, commercial banks cannot
market units of participation in IRA common trust funds.
I.

The Glass-Steagall Act-A Framework of Separation

The Glass-Steagall Act 5 was enacted in 1933 in response to the
banking collapse of the 1930's which significantly contributed to
the Great Depression. 6 Prior to the banking collapse, commercial
banks had become increasingly involved in investment banking activities. 7 Congress believed that the banking collapse could be di5 The Glass-Steagall Act is the popular name for the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48
Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). Although the Banking Act of 1933
contained many provisions of importance to the banking industry, such as those creating
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the term "Glass-Steagall Act" has come to represent those sections directed toward separating investment banking from commercial
banking. The relevant sections of the Banking Act, with corresponding U.S.C. sections, are
§ 5, 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1982); § 16, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982); § 20, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982);
§ 21, 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1982); and § 32, 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1982). See notes 15-28 infra and
accompanying text for an analysis of these provisions.
6 See generally Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88
BANKING LJ. 483 (1971), for an excellent account of the activities leading up to the passage
of the Glass-Steagall Act.
7 The first major effort by commercial banks to enter investment banking can be
traced back to the late 1800's when, in response to considerable competition from trust
companies, state-chartered banks demanded that their charter privileges be expanded. Perkins, supra note 6, at 488. Because the trust companies were organized under general incorporation laws, they were allowed to pursue any type of business activity. 5 BANKING LAW
(MB) § 96.02[1] (1985). These activities included the distribution of corporate securities as
either a sales agent or promoter and the purchasing of securities for accounts they managed. Id. After numerous pleas to their respective legislatures, the state-chartered banks
succeeded in expanding their privileges thereby eliminating any operational distinction between them and the trust companies. Perkins, supra note 6, at 488-89.
Nationally chartered banks, in response to the increased privileges of their counterparts, soon entered the investment banking field themselves. Their efforts, however,
faltered when the Supreme Court decided, in 1891, that nationally chartered banks could
not engage in investment banking activities because the national Bank Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat.
99 (1864) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), had not expressly
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rectly attributed to the involvement of commercial banks in
investment banking activity.8 Thus, the Glass-Steagall Act reflects
granted them this power. Logan County Nat'l Bank v. Townsend, 139 U.S. 67 (1891). The
Court reaffirmed its position in 1897 when it ruled that nationally chartered banks were
prohibited from underwriting corporate stocks. California Nat'l Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S.
362 (1897).
To avoid the impact of these decisions, national banks formed security affiliates to conduct their investment banking business. 5 BANKING LAW (MB) § 96.0211] (1985). Then
during World War I, in an effort to strengthen the Federal Reserve System ("Fed"), the
federal government allowed state-chartered banks and trust companies to enter the Fed
without having to relinquish their investment banking privileges. The nationally chartered
banks, which were members of the Fed, viewed this as an implicit approval of their security
affiliate system. Perkins, supra note 6, at 491. The legality of these affiliates, however, has
been questioned by several members of Congress because such affiliates were not authorized by the federal charters under which national banks operated. See 75 CONG. REC. 988788 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Glass); id. at 9911 (remarks of Sen. Bulkley).
By 1922, 62 commercial banks were directly engaged in investment banking and 10
others had formed security affiliates for that purpose. Perkins, supra note 6, at 492. In
1927, national banks received congressional approval to underwrite "investment securities" in the McFadden Act, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927) (codified in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.). "Investment securities" under McFadden were defined as marketable obligations, evidencing indebtedness of any person, copartnership, association, or corporation in
the form of bonds, notes, and debentures. This act, plus a rise in stock prices, provided
additional reasons for banks to expand their investment services. The expansion, however,
came at the sacrifice of commercial loan activity. For example, in 1924 commercial loan
volume was approximately $8 billion and new issues from one-half that amount. 77 CONG.
REC. 3957 (1933). In contrast, by 1929, commercial loans increased to $9 billion whereas
new issues increased to $10 billion. Also, by 1929, there were 300 security affiliates, of
which 200 belonged to national banks, 70 to state bank members of the Fed, and 30 to nonmember banks. 75 CONG REC. 9910 (1933). By 1930, the security affiliates of national
banks participated in 33.6% of all investment securities offerings while other bank affiliates
participated in 20.8%. 5 BANKING LAw (MB) § 96.02[1] (1985). Direct participation by
commercial banks and trust companies accounted for 6.8%. Id. In comparison, investment
banking firms participated in only 38.8%o of such issues. Id.
All the excitement surrounding the securities activities of commercial banks, however,
was shortlived. The stock market crash of 1929 aggravated by imprudent banking practices
caused many to question the wisdom of allowing commercial banks to engage in investment
activities. Such unsound practices included banks making unsound loans to their securities
affiliates, overextending themselves to purchase securities for their own accounts, dumping
bad loans on the securities affiliates, excessively promoting stock issues, and using investmdnt trusts as vehicles for speculation. See Note, Bank-Sponsored Investment Services: Statutory
Proscriptions,JurisdictionalConflicts, and a Legislative Proposal, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 776, 779-81
(1975). The "last straw" occurred in December 1930 when the Bank of the United States
failed largely as a result of its securities affiliates. Perkins, supra note 6, at 496-97. The
Bank failed in part because it had purchased its own worthless stock through its three securities affiliates thereby causing substantial losses to the affiliates. SeeJ. GOODBAR, MANAGING
THE PEOPLE'S MONEY 127, 130-35 (1935).
In response to these imprudent banking practices, Congress convened several times to
discuss curtailing investment banking activities of commercial banks. See generally Hearings
Pursuantto S. Res. 71 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 71st Cong.,
3d Sess. (1931); Hearing on the Operation of the National and Federal Reserve Banking Systems
Before the Senate Banking and Currency Comm. S. 4115, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932); Hearing on
Stock Exchange Practices Before the Senate Banking and Currency Comm., 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1933). After considerable debate, Congress, on June 13, 1933, passed the Banking Act of
1933, commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act. See Perkins, supra note 6, at 524.
8 75 CONG. REC. 9887 (1932). Indeed, Senator Carter Glass of Virginia, legislative
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the conclusion of Congress "that certain investment banking activities conflicted in fundamental ways with the institutional role of
commercial banks." 9 Through the Act, Congress attempted to
achieve three objectives: 10 (1) to structure the commercial banking
system in order to make it financially sound;"1 (2) to restore public
confidence in the national banking system; 12 and (3) to eliminate
conflicts of interest that inevitably arise when commercial banks en13
gage in investment activities.
In short, Glass-Steagall attempts to separate the commercial
and investment banking industries. The key provisions of the
Glass-Steagall Act relating to securities activities are sections 5,14
16,15 20,16 21,17 and 32.18 Sections 16 and 21 prohibit direct participation by commercial banks in investment banking activities and,
conversely, direct participation by investment banks in commercial
banking activities. 19 Section 5 extends this prohibition to statepatriarch of the Federal Reserve System and one of the authors of the Act, considered the
role of commercial banks in the securities market one of the greatest contributors to the
unprecedented disaster that precipitated the Great Depression.
9 See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 104 S. Ct.
2979, 2984 (1984) (commonly referred to as "Becker").
10 For discussion of these objectives, see Ianni, "Security" Under the Glass-SteagallActand
the Federal Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934: The Direction of the Supreme Court's Analysis, 100
BANKING LJ. 100 (1983); Plotkin, What Meaning Does Glass-SteagallHavefor Today's Financial
World?, 95 BANKING LJ. 404 (1978); Comment, A.G. Becker v. Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System: Commercial Paper is Not a Security Under the Glass-SteagallAct, 9 J. CORP. L. 321
(1984).
11 S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 10-12 (1933).
12 H. R. REP. No. 150, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1933).
13 75 CONG. REC. 9911-12 (1932) (statements of Sen. Bulkley).
14 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1982).
15 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982).
16 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982).
17 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1982).
18 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1982).
19 The relevant provision of § 16 is codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 24 (seventh) (West Supp.
1984). It provides that a national banking association shall have the following power:
Seventh. To exercise by its board of directors or duly authorized officers or
agents, subject to law, all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on
the business of banking; by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts,
bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying
and selling exchange, coin, and bullion; by loaning money on personal security;
and by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes according to the provisions of this
chapter. The business of dealing in securities and stock by the association shall be
limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely
upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own
account, and the association shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock:
Provided, That the association may purchase for its own account investment securities under such limitations and restrictions as the Comptroller of the Currency
may by regulation prescribe. In no event shall the total amount of the investment
securities of any one obligor or maker, held by the association for its own account,
exceed at any time 10 per centum of its capital stock actually paid in and
unimpaired and 10 per centum of its unimpaired surplus fund, except that this
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chartered banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System. 20 Sections 20 and 32 prohibit national and member banks
from indirectly participating in investment banking activity. 21 In
particular, section 20 prohibits a bank from creating an affiliate to
limitation shall not require any association to dispose of any securities lawfully
held by it on August 23, 1935. As used in this section the term "investment securities" shall mean marketable obligations, evidencing indebtedness of any person,
copartnership, association, or corporation in the form of bonds, notes and/or debentures commonly known as investment securities under such further definition
of the term "investment securities" as may by regulation be prescribed by the
Comptroller of the Currency. Except as hereinafter provided or otherwise permitted by law, nothing herein contained shall authorize the purchase by the association for its own account of any shares of stock of any corporation. The limitations
and restrictions herein contained as to dealing in, underwriting and purchasing for
its own account, investment securities shall not apply to obligations of the United
States, or general obligations of any State or of any political subdivision thereof
Section 21, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1982), provides in relevant part:
(a) After the expiration of one year after June 16, 1933, it shall be unlawful(1) For any person, firm, corporation, association, business trust, or other similar
organization, engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities, to engage at the same time to any extent
whatever in the business of receiving deposits subject to check or to repayment
upon presentation of a passbook, certificate of deposit, or other evidence of debt,
or upon request of the depositor: Provided,That the provisions of this paragraph
shall not prohibit national banks or State banks or trust companies (whether or not
members of the Federal Reserve System) or other financial institutions or private
bankers from dealing in, underwriting, purchasing, and selling investment securities to the extent permitted to national banking associations by the provisions of
section 24 of this title. ...
20 Section 5, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1982), provides in relevant part: " state member banks shall be subject to the same limitations and conditions with respect to the
purchasing, selling, underwriting, and holding of investment securities and stock as are
applicable in the case of national banks under paragraph "seventh" of Section 24 of this
title."
21 Section 20, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982), provides in relevant part:
After one year from June 16, 1933, no member bank shall be affiliated in any
manner described in subsection (b) of section 221a of this title with any corporation, association, business trust, or other similar organization engaged principally
in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or
retail or through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or
other securities: Provided, That nothing in this paragraph shall apply to any such
organization which shall have been placed in formal liquidation and which shall
transact no business except such as may be incidental to the liquidation of its
affairs.
Section 32, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1982), provides:
No officer, or employee of any corporation or unincorporated association, no
partner or employee of any partnership, and no individual, primarily engaged in
the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, of stocks, bonds, or other similar securities, shall serve the same time as an officer, director, or employee of any member
bank except in limited classes of cases in which the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System may allow such service by general regulations when in the
judgment of the said Board it would not unduly influence the investment policies
of such member bank or the advice it gives its customers regarding investments.
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engage in securities activity. 22 Section 32 prohibits national and
member banks from sharing personnel with investment banks.
Section 16, however, is the cornerstone of the Glass-Steagall
Act. It addresses three areas of banking activity:2 3 (1) bank underwriting of securities; (2) bank purchasing and selling of securities
for its customers; and (3) bank purchasing and selling of securities
for its own account. With regard to the first activity, it provides a
general prohibition of underwriting "securities and stocks." 24 This
prohibition has been the largest deterrent to commercial banks entering the investment banking business.
Under section 16, a commercial bank may purchase or sell securities for the account of its customers only under certain circumstances. Specifically, a commercial bank must act "without
recourse" and "solely upon the order of its customers." 2 5 Such language reflects Congress' desire to prohibit banks from initiating investment transactions for customers. Finally, section 16 permits a
bank to purchase investment securities for its own account with cer26
tain restrictions.
Section 21 also prohibits direct participation in investment
banking. This section provides that a firm engaged in the business
of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing securities shall not
also accept demand deposits. Conversely, the language of section
21 prohibits firms that accept demand deposits from engaging in
22 There has been recent congressional debate on expanding the powers of securities
affiliates. The 98th Congress had before it two acts which would expand the securities
powers of commercial banks, the Financial Institutions Equity Act of 1984, H.R. REP. No.
889, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) and the Financial Services Competitive Equity Act, S. REP.
No. 560, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). Although neither was enacted, the Senate's act,
found in S. 2851, did pass the first vote but died in conference. As initially passed, the bill
amended § 20 of Glass-Steagall to allow a member of the Federal Reserve System, through
its parent holding company or a subsidiary of the holding company, to be affiliated with a
depository institution securities affiliate ("DISA"). The DISA was given authorization to
engage in any securities and securities-related activities in which a national bank may engage. Moreover, DISA's were given the additional authority to underwrite and deal in revenue bonds, mortgage-backed securities, and commercial paper.
It should be noted, that although the Senate approved the additional securities power,
a number of Senators strongly disapproved of such increased power, e.g., Senators Heinz,
D'Amato, Riegle, and Sarbanes. In fact, Senator Heinz proposed an amendment which
would have stricken the securities powers from S. 2851 but later withdrew it apparently on
the belief that the powers would be removed in conference. Senator Heinz indicated that if
the powers remained in the bill after conference, the bill would not "have a very easy time
when it comes back to the Senate." 130 CONG. REC. Sli,162 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984).
Senator Garn, who fully supported the bill, indicated that the securities power was "the
heart of this bill." 130 CoNG. REC. S I1,117 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984). See 130 CONG. REC.
S11,116-71 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984), for debate on S. 2851. Neither act has been reintroduced into the 99th Congress.
23 5 BANKING LAw (MB) § 96.02(2] (1985).
24 12 U.S.C.A. § 24 (seventh) (West Supp. 1984).
25 Id.
26 Id.

NOTES
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securities activities. Section 21 extends the Act's underwriting prohibition beyond the national and member banks covered in sections
5 and 16 to include any entity engaged "in the business of receiving
deposits." 27 Thus, through sections 5, 16, and 21 of the GlassSteagall Act, Congress has prohibited all commercial banks from
28
directly participating in investment banking activities.
II.

The Problem of Applying Glass-Steagall to Units of
Participation
Recently, commercial banks have established arrangements in
which the bank places the customer's IRA trust assets into a common trust fund and, in return, issues the customer units of participation in the common fund. The issue is whether such an
arrangement constitutes investment banking in violation of the
Glass-Steagall Act. Two recent district court opinions have addressed the issue and, on virtually identical facts, reached different
conclusions.
In Investment Company Institute v. Conover ("ICI 1"),29 the court
set aside two rulings by the Comptroller of the Currency ("Comptroller") 30 that approved proposals by two national banks to offer
units of participation in collective trust funds for IRA trust assets.
ICI 1 held that the common trust funds were in the nature of an
investment vehicle rather than for a bona fide fiduciary purpose
and, therefore, violated the Glass-Steagall Act. In Investment Company Institute v. Conover ("ICI 2"),31 the court upheld the Comptroller's ruling. Contrary to ICI 1, ICI 2 held that the activity fulfilled a
bona fide fiduciary purpose and was a natural extension of tradi32
tional banking functions.
In each case, the commercial bank had created a common trust
fund ("Fund") for the collective investment of IRA trust assets re27 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (1982).
28 Despite the broad coverage of Glass-Steagall, there is a loophole that some commercial banks may use to avoid the Act's "flat prohibitions." The loophole exists for state
chartered banks which are not members of the Federal Reserve System. These banks,
through a subsidiary, may expand their product offerings without violating Glass-Steagall.
Moreover, the state non-member bank may be outside the reach of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 80 Stat. 133 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1848 (1982)), which
governs permissible activities of holding company subsidiaries. See Note, Avoiding the GlassSteagall and Bank Holding Company Acts: An Option for Bank Product Expansion, 59 IND. Lj. 89
(1983), for an analysis of this loophole.
29 593 F. Supp. 846 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
30 The office of Comptroller was created by Act of Congress on February 25, 1863 as
an integral part of the national banking system. The Comptroller is responsible for the
execution of laws relating to national banks and promulgates rules and regulations governing the operations of national and District of Columbia banks. BLAcK's LAW DICTONARY
260 (5th ed. 1979).
31 596 F. Supp. 1486 (D.D.C. 1984).
32 Id. at 1502.
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ceived from bank customers.33 Pursuant to a trust agreement, the
trust assets were invested into one of several portfolios contained in
the Fund.3 4 The customer's interest in the portfolios chosen was
evidenced by "units of participation." 3' 5 Labels attached by the
banks to such portfolios included "Corporate Stock Fund"3 6 and
"Small Companies Stock Funds." 3 7 The trust agreement was freely
revocable 3 8 and the invested assets were readily transferable between the Fund's portfolios or other IRA plans offered by the
bank.3 9 Further, the value of the customer's interest varied directly
with the value of the particular portfolio chosen. Finally, the bank
received a monthly fee based on the value of each portfolio. 40 In
both cases, the banks contended that offering of units of participation in the funds was authorized under three separate areas of law:
(1) the Glass-Steagall Act, (2) the Comptroller's regulations, 4 1 and
33 593 F. Supp. at 848; 596 F. Supp. at 1498-1499.
34 593 F. Supp. at 848; 596 F. Supp. at 1499.
35 593 F. Supp. at 848; 596 F. Supp. at 1499.
36 593 F. Supp. at 856.
37 Id.
38 593 F. Supp. at 849; 596 F. Supp. at 1499. Although the investor may "redeem" his
shares at any time, he may subject himself to an "early withdrawal" penalty provided for in
I.R.C. § 408(f)(1) (1984). This section provides that if a "distribution from an individual
retirement account

. . .

is made before such individual attains age 59-l/2 his tax

. . .

for

the taxable year in which such distribution is received shall be increased by an amount
equal to 10 percent of the amount of the distribution." Notwithstanding such a penalty, it
is possible that an investor may be willing to pay the 10% tax either to cash in on a significant increase in the value of a portfolio where a decrease is expected or to mitigate future
losses in a poorly performing portfolio. Thus, the "redeemable" feature must be considered when identifying the potential hazards created by this arrangement.
39 593 F. Supp. at 849; 596 F. Supp. at 1499.
40 593 F. Supp. at 849; 596 F. Supp. at 1499.
41 See generally 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (1984). The banks argued that the selling of units of
participation in IRA common trust funds is authorized by the Comptroller's regulations. It
is interesting to note, however, that several requirements in the regulations were waived by
the Comptroller. Basically, the requirements waived were those in direct conflict with provisions under the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("ICA"). Rather than attempt to obtain an exemption under the ICA, the banks asked the Comptroller to waive the conflicting
provisions in its regulations.
Interestingly, the banks indicated they opted not to pursue exemptions from the SEC
as they feared that avenue might be costly and time-consuming. 593 F. Supp. at 852; 569 F.
Supp. at 1499. However, and perhaps more important to their decision not to pursue these
exemptions, the SEC has, in a series of interpretative letters, maintained that no exemption
is available under the Securities Act and the ICA when a bank seeks to collectively invest
IRA trust assets in a manner sought by the banks in ICI I and ICI 2. See FED. BANKING L.
REP. (CCH), Transfer Binder, 99,339, at 86,375 (1982). See also SEC Release No. 33-6188
(Feb. 1, 1980). The SEC contends it would grant an exemption if the funds were maintained for a "bona fide fiduciary purpose" but that it will not when the funds are "maintained as vehicles for direct investment." Thus, because the SEC has steadfastly refused to
grant an exemption, one can find further support for the "investment" character of the
funds, if need be.
One provision waived by the Comptroller is the requirement that there be "exclusive
bank management" of the common trust fund. 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b)(12) (1984). In the
Funds set up, only a minority of those managing the funds were affiliated with the bank.
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(3) ERISA. 4 2
In ICI 1, the court applied a "fiduciary purpose v. investment
purpose" 43 test. The court held that if the Fund was created solely

for an investment purpose rather than for a bona fide fiduciary purpose, the Fund would violate the Act. Conversely, if the bank created the Fund solely for a fiduciary purpose, the Fund would be
proper. 44 Finding that the Fund was created for an investment purpose, the Court held that the units of participation were securities
and could not be offered without violating Glass-Steagall.
The ICI 2 court, on the other hand, believed that the units of
participation represented "a natural extension of a traditional
This was done in order to qualify under the ICA which requires that a majority of the
Fund's directors not be affiliated with any one banks. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10c (1982). Another
provision waived by the Comptroller provides: "No bank administering a collective investment fund shall issue any certificate or other document evidencing a direct or indirect interest in such
fund in any form." 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b)(13) (1984) (emphasis added). The plain language of
this provision prohibits the type of activity at issue. Nevertheless, the Comptroller, without
explanation, waived its application. Based on these waivers, it is apparent the Comptroller
was intent on approving these Funds. Moreover, the effectiveness of arguing that the
Comptroller's regulations should supersede the Glass-Steagall Act is undercut by the fact
that Congress rejected a regulatory approach when it drafted the statute. See Becker, 104 S.
Ct. at 2988-89. Thus, notwithstanding adherence to the Comptroller's regulations, the
banks cannot escape the prohibitions of the Glass-Steagall Act.
42 The banks further argued that the offering of units of participation is expressly authorized under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 26 U.S.C. § 408
(1982). Specifically, § 408(a)(5) provides: "The assets of the trust fund will not be commingled with other property except in a common trust fund or common investment fund."
This argument fails to recognize the difference between using a collective trust fund for the
commingling of trust assets and the offering of units in such a fund. The distinction is
critical.
Assuming, arguendo, that ERISA does authorize such activity, the banks nevertheless
cannot escape the reach of the Glass-Steagall Act. This conclusion follows from an excerpt
from a House Conference Report on ERISA: "this legislation. . . is not intended to limit
in any way the application of the Federal securities laws to [IRA's] or the application to
them of the laws relating to common trust or investment funds maintained by any institution." H. CONF. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5117.
43 593 F. Supp. at 853-56.
44 The court's approach appears to be based on an interpretation of a statement in
Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp that indicates it is proper for a bank to commingle assets
received for "a true fiduciary purpose" but not for an investment purpose. 401 U.S. 617,
638 (1971). The Court's language, however, cannot be read so broadly as to create a "fiduciary purpose v. investment purpose" distinction to determine whether a security is present. Rather, the Court merely is specifying when a bank might commingle the assets of its
customers. The offering of units of participation in collective trusts, however, differs significantly from the commingling of trust assets. The court in ICI 1 recognized this distinction,
593 F. Supp. at 858, and the Comptroller's own regulations recognize such a distinction, 12
C.F.R. § 9.18(b)(13) (1984). In any event, the Supreme Court appears to have rejected an
analysis of an instrument's "investment" character to determine whether it is a security.
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 104 S. Ct. 2979,
2988 (1984). In rejecting this analysis, the Court concluded that the Act's flat prohibition
does not allow for nebulous inquiry into the particular characteristics of a financial instrument. Id. at 2988.
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banking service." 4 5 Thus, based on its interpretation of Investment
Company Institute v. Camp,4 6 the court held that units of participation
were not securities within the meaning of the Glass-Steagall Act
47
and therefore could be offered without violating the Act.
III.

Developing The Two Prong Test

The conflict between the two district courts indicates the need
for guidance in determining the applicability of the Glass-Steagall
Act to IRA units of participation. To date, the Supreme Court has
addressed the scope of the Act on three occasions 48 but has never
specifically addressed the IRA units of participation problem. Nevertheless, from these cases it is possible to synthesize a two prong
test for determining the Act's applicability. In essence, the Act applies if (1) the instrument in question is a "security" within the
meaning of the Act, and (2) the bank's activity gives rise to the
hazards that prompted Congress to pass the Act.
A.

What is a "Security" Under Glass-Steagall?

Because the Glass-Steagall Act does not define the term "securities," the courts have had to formulate a definition. The
Supreme Court first considered what constitutes a security under
the Act in Investment Company Institute v. Camp. 49 In Camp, a commercial bank established a collective investment fund pursuant to regulations issued by the Comptroller. 50 Under the fund, the customer
would give the bank between $10,000 and $500,000. The bank
would then act as the customer's managing agent. In return, the
bank would give the customer written evidence of his interest in the
fund identified as "units of participation.' 5 1 The units were freely
redeemable and transferable. 5 2 Further, the units' value was directly tied to the value of the fund. 53 The bank registered the fund
as an investment company under the Investment Company Act of
45 596 F. Supp. at 1500, 1502.
46 Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 624 (1971). Arguably, Camp's statement
does not create the "traditional v. nontraditional" analysis suggested by the Comptroller
and ICI 2. Rather, Camp merely states a historical fact. Moreover, Camp fails to later mention this fact when analyzing in depth the reach of Glass-Steagall. Consequently, to argue
Camp establishes some type of "historical" test is to read too much into Camp.
47 596 F. Supp. at 1501.
48 Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 104 S. Ct.
2979 (1984); Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46
(1981); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
49 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
50 Id. at 622.

51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.

1985]

NOTES

1940 ("ICA") 5 4 and filed a registration statement pursuant to the
Securities Act of 1933. 55 The plaintiff, an association of openended investment companies, challenged the regulations and the
56
Comptroller's approval of the fund.
The Supreme Court found the fund to be in "direct competition with the mutual fund industry" and therefore held that the
bank's activity was prohibited under sections 16 and 21 of the
Glass-Steagall Act. 5 7 Significantly, the Court indicated that "there

is nothing in the phrasing of either §§ 16 or 21 that suggests a narrow reading of the word 'securities.' "58 With its expansive approach to the definition of securities, the Court then engaged in a
limited "functional analysis," 59 comparing the particular characteristics of the instruments in issue with other valid bank instruments.
The Court, in a later case, rejected such an analysis.60 Camp, however, remains important precedent for an expansive interpretation
of the term "securities" under the Glass-Steagall Act.
The Supreme Court's most recent case construing the GlassSteagall Act is Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System ("Becker"). 6 1 In Becker, a state-chartered commercial bank, acting as agent, attempted to sell the commercial paper of
its corporate customers. 62 The Securities Industry Association
("SIA") challenged the Federal Reserve Board's ruling that sec63
tions 16 and 21 do not prohibit the sale of commercial paper.
The district court in Becker, in reversing the Board's ruling,
found that the Board had used a "functional analysis" to determine
that the instrument offered by the bank was not a security under the
Act.64 The court indicated that such an analysis could transform a
transaction "unquestionably at the heart of the securities industry
54 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1982).
55 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1982).
56 401 U.S. at 617.
57 Id. at 625.
58 Id. at 635. This expansive approach is significant because it reflects an approach
similar to that used in defining "securities" under the federal securities law. This similarity
in treatment indicates that the federal securities laws should be looked to when attempting
to define a "security" under Glass-Steagall. See notes 70-74 infra and accompanying text
for this argument.
59 401 U.S. at 624-25, 637. The Court compared.the bank investment fund at issue
with a mutual fund and found subtle differences at best. Because competition with mutual
funds requires a bank to make accommodations that Congress firmly concluded could not
be prudently mixed with the business of commercial banking, the activity must be
prohibited.
60 See Becker, 104 S.Ct. at 2989.
61 104 S.Ct. 2979 (1984).
62 Id at 2981.
63 Id. at 2982.
64 519 F. Supp. at 615-16.
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into permissible activity for commercial depository banks." 6 5 On
appeal, however, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit endorsed the Board's functional analysis. 6 6 The court of appeals, concluding that the commercial paper did not possess the
characteristics that prompted passage of the Act, determined that
67
the commercial paper did not constitute securities under the Act.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision,
stating "we find it difficult to imagine that Congress intended the
Board to enage in the subtle and ad hoc 'functional analysis'
.... "68 The Court held that "the Act's underwriting prohibition
does not demonstrate any sensitivity to the characteristics of a particular issue; the Act simply prohibits commercial banks from un69
derwriting them all."
The Court declined to engage in the functional analysis it developed in Camp. Instead, the Court looked to the plain and ordinary meaning of the term "securities" as evidenced by other
legislation enacted at the time of Glass-Steagall. 70 Thus, although
the Court did not hold that a "security" under the Securities Act of
1933 is also a "security" under Glass-Steagall, what constitutes a
"security" under the Securities Act is persuasive. The Court's willingness to refer to the federal securities laws for guidance as to
what constitutes a security under Glass-Steagall appears based on
its belief that both pieces of legislation are "collectively designed to
restore public confidence in financial markets." 7 1 Because of the
common purpose, the Court reasoned that the term "security"
72
under both pieces of legislation should have the same meaning.
Finally, in attempting to define a security under Glass-Steagall, the
Court refused to engage in what it terms a "nebulous inquiry"
65 Id. at 615.
66 693 F.2d at 147-51.
67 Id.
68 104 S. Ct. at 2989.
69 Id. at 2988.
70 Id. at 2987.
71 Id.
72 This reasoning has not received widespread acceptance. The court of appeals in
Becker indicated that "there is no reason . . .to assume that Congress intended the term

"securities" to bear the same meaning in these different statutory contexts." 693 F.2d at
146. The court based its decision in part on the different purposes of the two Acts, contending the Glass-Steagall Act was enacted to protect bank depositors whereas the Securities Act of 1933 was enacted to prevent fraud and protect investors. However, the court's
"different purposes" contention is undercut by statements of those involved with the pas-

sage of both Acts. President Roosevelt claimed that the Securities Act was "one step in our
broad purpose of protecting investors and depositors." 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933) (emphasis
added). Furthermore, Senator Luce indicated that Glass-Steagall's "purpose is. . .to furnish more protection to depositors and investors." 77 CONG. REC. 5896 (1933) (emphasis added). For an excellent discussion of the definition of "securities" under the Glass-Steagall

Act and the Securities Act of 1933, see generally Ianni, supra note 10.
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whereby the particular characteristics of an instrument are analyzed
in detail to determine whether it is a security under Glass-Steagall. 73 The Court reasoned that the "flat prohibitions" in the Act

prohibiting commercial banks from entering the investment banking area do not permit such an inquiry. 74 In essence, Camp and
Becker suggest that the Supreme Court will take an expansive view
of the term securities in the Glass-Steagall Act and will be predisposed to finding that the particular instrument involved is a security. Accordingly, the second prong which considers the bank's role
in the transaction will often be crucial in determining the Act's
applicability.
B.

The Role of the Bank in the Transaction

After the court determines that the instrument is a security, it
must then consider the second prong of the test-the role of the
bank in the transaction. Only if the bank's activity gives rise to the
hazards that prompted Congress to enact Glass-Steagall will a violation be found. This second prong is developed in Board of Governors
of FederalReserve System v. Investment Company Institute ("ICI"),7 5 the

Supreme Court's second case interpreting Glass-Steagall. In ICI,
the bank attempted to offer investment advice through its affiliated
closed-end investment company. 76 The parties conceded that the
shares of the investment company were securities. Nevertheless,
the Court examined the bank's role to determine if the bank had
violated the Act.
In determining the propriety of the bank's role in ICI, the
Court examined several factors which it had identified in Camp.
Camp listed a number of hazards that arise when a commercial bank
directly or indirectly enters the investment banking business.
Those hazards include: (1) the bank's investment of its own assets
in frozen or otherwise imprudent stock or security investments;
73 104 S. Ct. at 2988.
74 Id. at 2985.
75 450 U.S. 46 (1981).
76 Id at 58-60. A closed-end investment company is "any management company other
than an open-end company." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(2) (1982). In contrast, an open-end
company "means a management company which is offering for sale or has outstanding any
redeemable security of which it is the issuer." -15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1) (1982). Thus, the
major distinction between the two is whether the investment company issues redeemable
securities. The typical open-end company (commonly referred to as a "mutual fund") issues only redeemable shares which it stands ready to redeem at all times. A "redeemable
security" is one that entitles the holder upon presentation to the issuer to receive approximately his proportionate share of the issuer's current net assets, or the cash equivalent
thereof. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(32) (1982). In contrast, the holder of the closed-end company's stock typically must sell his shares to another person in the open market. See R.
JENNINGS & H. MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION-CASES AND MATERIALS 1356-66 (5th
ed. 1982), for a general discussion of "open-end" and "closed-end" companies.
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(2) the creation of promotional pressures upon banks to shore up
an affiliate engaged in securities; (3) the possibility that a bank
might make its credit facilities more available to those companies in
whose stock or security the affiliate has invested or become otherwise involved; (4) the creation of a salesman's interest that might
impair the bank's ability to function as an impartial source of credit;
(5) the danger that depositors might suffer losses on investments
that they purchased in reliance upon the prudence of the bank;
(6) the temptation to make loans to customers with the expectation
that the loan would facilitate the purchase of stocks and securities;
and (7) the danger that the bank's reputation for prudence and restraint would be undercut by the risks necessarily incident to the
investment banking business. 77 In ICI, the Court determined that
78
the bank's activity did not violate Glass-Steagall.
In Becker, the Supreme Court again considered the role of the
bank, using the hazards listed in Camp as a framework for its analysis. Indeed, Becker rejected the Board's "functional analysis" pri79
marily because the Board failed to consider the bank's conduct.
Because the Becker Court found a number of the hazards present in
80
the bank's conduct, it held that the bank had violated the Act.
IV.

Applying the Two Prong Test to IRA Units of Participation

The two prong test which considers whether the instrument involved is a security, and whether the bank's activity tends to create
certain hazards, may be applied to IRA units of participation to determine Glass-Steagall applicability. This test demonstrates that
Glass-Steagall applies to IRA units of participation. First, units of
participation in IRA common trust funds constitute securities
under the Glass-Steagall Act. The Supreme Court has refused to
narrowly interpret the term "securities" in the Glass-Steagall Act.
Thus, the Court will not limit the Act's application to traditional
securities. It is, therefore, irrelevant that IRA units of participation
are not traditional securities. Second, to determine which instruments are securities under the Act, the Court has referred to the
contemporaneously enacted federal securities laws. A review of the
Securities Act of 1933 suggests that units of participation in com77 401 U.S. at 630-32.
78 450 U.S. at 67. The Court found that the absence of an obligation to redeem sharply
distinguishes a closed-end investment company from the open-end investment company
found to violate Glass-Steagall in Camp. Without such an obligation, the closed-end investment company "would not be constantly involved in the search for new capital to cover
redemptions." Id. The effort to cover redemptions was thought to be a hazard which Congress attempted to eliminate through the passage of Glass-Steagall. Id.
79 104 S. Ct. at 2989.
80 Id. at 2989-91.

1985]

NOTES

mon trust funds are securities under the 1933 Act.8 1 Although a
security under the federal securities laws is not necessarily a security under Glass-Steagall, the security laws are nevertheless highly
persuasive.8 2 For example, in Becker, the Court relied extensively
on the federal securities laws in defining a security under the Glass83
Steagall Act.
The third factor in determining whether an instrument is a security under the Act is the Court's refusal to engage in a nebulous
inquiry into the instrument's investment characteristics.8 4 This refusal effectively prohibits any test which balances the instrument's
investment characteristics against its fiduciary characteristics to determine whether the instrument is a security. The Court's refusal
to delve into the particular characteristics of an instrument, its refusal to narrowly interpret the term "securities," and its willingness
to refer to the federal securities laws make it likely that the Court
will hold that units of participation in IRA common trust funds are
securities under the Glass-Steagall Act. Thus, IRA units of participation satisfy the first prong of the test for Glass-Steagall
applicability.
Units of participation also satisfy the second prong, the role of
the bank in the transaction. In determining whether the bank's
conduct gives rise to the hazards which Congress attempted to alleviate by passing the Act, it is necessary to refer to the dangers listed
in Camp.8 5 When a commercial bank offers IRA units of participation, it risks many of the hazards Congress sought to avoid. Most
significantly, the commercial bank acquires a "salesman's stake" in
selling the units of participation. This salesman's interest arises in
part because the commercial bank's monthly fee is directly related
to the value of the particular Fund portfolio. Accordingly, the commercial bank can increase its fee each month merely by selling additional units in the portfolios. As the Court in Camp indicated, "[i]t
is not a matter of indifference to the bank whether the customer
buys an interest in the bank fund or makes some other investment."8' 6 It is this type of salesman's interest which Glass-Steagall
81 15 U.S.C. § 77(c) (1982) provides an exemption from the Act's disclosure requirements for a number of classes of securities. One such class of securities is described as:
"any interest or participationin any common truistfund or similarfund maintained by a bank exclusively for the collective investment and reinvestment of assets contributed thereto by such
bank in its capacity as trustee, executor, administrator, or guardian" 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(c)(a)(2) (1982) (emphasis added). Based on this description, it is apparent that units
of participation in IRA common trust funds would be considered a security under the federal securities laws. See Becker, 104 S.Ct. at 2987.
82 See notes 70-74 supra and accompanying text.
83 104 S.Ct. at 2987.
84 Id. at 2988.
85 See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
86 401 U.S. at 636.
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attempts to prevent.
Moreover, the "salesman's stake" in selling units of participation causes the commercial banks to engage in a manner of advertising forbidden under the Act. In advertising the Fund portfolios,
the banks often directly compare the Fund to mutual funds. Such a
comparison is precisely what Congress feared. As the Camp Court
states: "When a bank puts itself in competition with mutual funds,
the bank must make an accommodation to the kind of ground rules
that Congress firmly concluded could not be prudently mixed with
87
the business of commercial banking."
A second hazard that arises when a commercial bank offers
units of participation is the impairment of the bank's role as a disinterested investment advisor. 88 In selling units of participation, the
bank stands to gain profits because its fee is based, in part, on the
amount it sells each month. Given the similarity between the Fund
portfolios and mutual funds, bank investment advisors naturally
lose their impartiality and opt to sell an in-house product. In fact, it
could be a tenuous situation for banking personnel to advise customers to invest their money in a mutual fund when the bank offers
a similar product. Consequently, rather than weighing the merits
of the investment alternatives, the bank's investment advisor may
feel "forced" to sell the in-house product to the bank customers.
Also, when a commercial bank offers units of participation in
IRA trust funds, it risks the impairment of public confidence if the
Fund is unsuccessful, a possibility given the volatility of the stock
market in recent years. Further, given the redemption feature of
units of participation, banks could find themselves constantly involved in the search for new capital to cover redemptions. The
effort to cover redemptions was also thought to be a hazard which
the Act attempted to alleviate.8 9 Finally, the commercial bank's
reputation for prudence and restraint could lead customers into a
false sense of security when placing money into the bank's portfolios. Clearly, the investor who places IRA funds with a mutual fund
recognizes some level of risk. Because of the bank's traditional reputation for prudence, however, an investor may believe that depositing IRA funds with a bank involves less risk, even though the
product offered by the bank is identical to that offered by the mutual fund. It is the manipulation of this false sense of security which
87 Id. at 637.
88 Senator Bulkley indicated that when a bank has something to sell in which it stands
to receive some form of underwriting profit, it is much less qualified to render disinterested
investment advice than the banker who has nothing to sell to his depositors. 75 CONG. REC.
9912 (1932).
89 See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
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the Act aims to prevent. 90 The potential hazards created when a
bank offers units of participation indicates that IRA units of participation also satisfy the second prong of the test. Accordingly, the
Glass-Steagall Act should apply and prohibit commercial banks
from offering these units of participation in IRA common trust
funds.
V. Conclusion
The Glass-Steagall Act has separated the investment banking
industry and the commercial banking industry for over fifty years.
Recent attempts by both industries to engage in the other's business have brought the Act's provisions under careful scrutiny. Unfortunately, the Comptroller and some lower federal courts have
created various approaches to interpreting the Act that have led to
ad hoc, inconsistent decisions. In the most recent dispute, confusion exists in distinguishing collective trust funds from units of participation in such funds and in the propriety of using a functional
analysis approach in defining a security under the Act. An analysis
of the Supreme Court's decisions in Camp, ICI, and Becker, however,
reveals a principled, two prong test for determining the Act's application. This test demonstrates that Glass-Steagall applies to IRA
units of participation. Accordingly, the Act prohibits commercial
banks from offering units of participation in IRA common trust
funds.
Jeffrey L. Elverman

90

See note 77 supra and accompanying text.

